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I. INTRODUCTION
Proposed in 1984, quantum key distribution (QKD)
allows two users to exchange provably secure keys via a
potentially insecure quantum channel1. Since then, QKD
has attracted much attention and significant progress
has been made in both theory and practice2,3. On the
application front, however, the operating distance of
practical fibre-based QKD systems is limited to about
150 km4, which is mainly due to the high background
noise produced by commonly used semiconductor single-
photon detectors5,6 (SPDs) and the stringent demand
on the minimum classical-post-processing (CPP) block
size7–9. Here, we present, for the first time, a compact
and autonomous QKD system that is capable of dis-
tributing provably-secure cryptographic key over 307 km
of ultra-low-loss optical fibre (51.9 dB loss). The system
is based on a recently developed standard semiconductor
(inGaAs) SPDs10 with record low background noise and
a novel efficient finite-key security analysis for QKD. This
demonstrates the feasibility of practical long-distance
QKD based on standard fibre-optic telecom components.
In order to achieve long-distance QKD, existing sys-
tems usually resort to using superconducting nanowire
single-photon detectors (SNSPD) which can achieve a low
dark count rate (DCR), but require cryogenic tempera-
tures (<3 K). In addition, a weaker security framework
is usually taken, i.e., by assuming individual attacks in-
stead of coherent attacks. Crucially, all record-distance
demonstrations to date have ignored corrections due to
finite-length keys7–9; in particular, it has been shown that
corrections due to finite-length keys are non-negligible
for realistic CPP block sizes. This means that previ-
ous QKD demonstrations might be overly optimistic in
the achievable distance. Table I summarises recent fi-
bre based QKD demonstrations. For distances beyond
160 km, the systems required the use of SNSPDs and thus
are incompatible with compact implementations. To the
best of our knowledge, only a handful of QKD implemen-
tations take finite-length key corrections into account for
their security analyses. For example, see the demonstra-
tion by Lucamarini et al11, which distributed provably-
secure keys using a fibre of about 90 km. Although we
have restricted our comparison to fibre based prepare-
and-measure discrete-variable experiments, we note that
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significant progress has also been made in continuous
variable12 and free-space QKD13,14.
II. RESULTS
Our system is based on the coherent one-way (COW)24
QKD protocol, where the bit string is encoded in the
time of arrival of weak coherent laser pulses (WCPs) and
the channel disturbance is monitored by measuring the
visibility of the interference between neighbouring pulses.
That is, bit 0 and 1 are sent using |α0〉 := |0〉|α〉 and
|α1〉 := |α〉|0〉, respectively. On Bob’s side, he simply
recovers the bit value by measuring the arrival time of the
laser pulse, e.g., bit 1 is detected if there is a detection in
the later time. To detect attacks on |α0〉 and |α1〉, Alice
randomly sends an additional test state, |αt〉 := |α〉|α〉, to
check for phase coherence between any two successive
laser pulses. Therefore, phase coherence can be checked
in any of these sequences, |α0〉|α1〉, |α0〉|αt〉, |αt〉|α1〉,
|αt〉, |αt〉|αt〉, by using an imbalanced interferometer with
a pulse delay on Bob’s side. The physical implementation
is outlined in figure 1.
The security of our QKD system is based on the univer-
sally composable security framework25,26. In particular,
we say that our QKD is qkd-secure whenever it is sec-
secret and cor-correct. Here, sec-secret means that the
output secret key is distinguishable from an ideal secret
key with probability at most sec, and cor-correct means
that probability of Alice and Bob having identical secret
keys is at least 1 − cor. Using this security framework
and under the assumption of collective attacks27, we are
able to derive a bound on the maximum value of the ex-
tractable secret key length, `, in terms of a fixed security
parameter qkd and the observed statistics. Accordingly,
this allows us to select the appropriate family of universal
hash functions for privacy amplification, which extracts
a secret key of size ` from a weakly random string of size
ncpp. Specifically, for some parameter β ∈ (0, qkd/4),
laser pulse intensity µ, CPP block size, ncpp, and the
number of bits revealed during error correction, mIR, we
can extract a qkd-secure key of length (see Supplemen-
tary Information (SI) for the full security analysis)
` ≤ max
β
⌊
ncpp
[
1− Qˆ− (1− Qˆ)h
(
1 + ξ(µ, Vˆ
2
)]
− 7
√
ncpp log2
1
β
−mIR − log2
2
4corβ2
⌋
, (1)
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2TABLE I. Summary of notable QKD demonstrations, outlining the maximum achievable distance, detector type used, and the
level of security. Where the finite-key analysis was not carried out the CPP block size, ncpp, was left blank and the security
parameter, qkd could not be defined.
Quantum channel Detector Security
Length Attenuation Type Temperature Protocol Attacks Finite-key size qkd rsec
(km) (dB) (K) (bps)
This work 307 51.9 InGaAs c 153 COW Collective 6.6×105 4× 10−9 3.18
Wang 201215 260 52.9 SNSPD 1.7 DPS Individual - - 1.85
Stucki 200916 250 42.9 SNSPD 2.5 COW Collective - - 15
Takesue 200717 200 42.1 SNSPD 3 DPS Individual - - 12.1
Liu 201018 200 - SNSPD 2.4 BB84 Collective - - 15
Rosenberg 200919 135 27.8 SNSPD 3 BB84 Collective - - 0.2
Namekata 201120 160 33.6 InGaAs d 193 DPS Individual - - 490
Yuan 200921 100 20 InGaAs d 243 BB84 Collective - - 1.01× 104
Shimizu 201422 90 a 30 SNSPD 2.5 DPS Individual - - 1100
Lucamarini 201311 80 b 16 InGaAs d 243 BB84 Collective ∼ 109 ∼ 10−10 1.20× 105
Walenta 201423 25 b 5.3 InGaAs d 293 COW Collective 106 4× 10−9 2.25× 104
a Installed fibre link
b Wavelength multiplexing of classical and quantum channels over a single fibre
c Free-running operation
d Gated operation
where h(x) is the binary entropy function and ξ(a, b) :=
(2Vˆ −1) exp(−µ)−2
√
(1− exp(−2µ))Vˆ (1− Vˆ ). Here, Qˆ
and Vˆ are the measured quantum bit error rate (QBER)
in the raw string and the visibility, respectively.
In our system, the QBER is directly measured by
counting how many bits are flipped during the error cor-
ruption step, meaning that, provided the verification step
passes, the uncertainty in this measurement is zero. For
the estimation of visibility, we need to consider the prob-
lem of random sampling without replacement, i.e., based
on the observed visibility Vobs in the monitoring line,
we want to estimate the visibility Vkey of the quantum
signals used to generate the secret key. More formally,
for some positive deviation term t, we like to show that
Vkey ≤ Vobs− t is highly unlikely; note that Vˆ = Vobs− t.
In the literature, finite-key security analyses commonly
use the Chernoff-Hoeffding tail inequality or Serfling tail
inequality to solve this problem. However, these inequal-
ities are only optimal for sufficiently large sample sizes,
and thus are not suitable for long-distance QKD where
sample sizes are small. To resolve this issue, we derive a
new tail inequality that is specifically tailored for random
sampling without replacement. In particular, we exploit
the fact that the distribution of errors in a random sam-
ple is described by the hypergeometric distribution, and
then use tight bounds for binomial coefficients to derive
an upper bound on Pr [Vkey ≤ Vobs − t]. More precisely,
we are able to show that the following relation,
Vkey ≥ Vobs − t(ncpp, nvis, Vobs, β), (2)
holds with probability at least 1 − β, and where nvis is
the number of events used to calculate Vobs. The explicit
expression of t(ncpp, nvis, Vobs, β) is deferred to the Meth-
ods section. In comparison to existing tail inequalities,
the new inequality takes into account the measured er-
ror rate of the random sample and thus provides a much
sharper bound on the tail event, i.e.,Vkey ≤ Vobs−t. To il-
lustrate the tightness of this new bound, figure 2a shows
the numerically optimised secret key rates (SKRs) for
different CPP block sizes based on the previous bound23
and the new tail inequality. The performance enhance-
ment with small ncpp is significant, allowing key distri-
bution to around 310 km even with ncpp = 10
5, which
would not have been possible with the old bound. At
300 km the SKR reaches 84.5% of the asymptotic limit
with ncpp = 10
7, which is an order of magnitude smaller
than previously thought required11.
Another enabling factor of this work has been our re-
cent demonstration that detectors based on InGaAs/InP
negative feedback avalanche diodes (NFADs)28 can oper-
ate with extremely low noise in the free-running regime10.
This marked an improvement of over two orders of mag-
nitude compared to previous InGaAs detectors. Due to
a separate avalanche and multiplication28 structure typ-
ically used in such SPDs, where InGaAs is used for the
absorption region, and InP for the avalanche region, dark
carriers are generated by two different mechanisms. In
fact, at temperatures above 200 K, thermal dark carrier
generation in the absorption region is dominant: below
this temperature, trap-assisted tunnelling (TAT) in the
multiplication region becomes the dominant effect. Gen-
erally, TAT has a small temperature dependence, how-
ever, the breakdown voltage (VBR) of InP has a linear
dependance on temperature. This means that reducing
the temperature below 200 K still leads to a reduction of
the DCR, because the operating voltage is reduced, low-
ering the TAT contribution which is a field-dependent
effect29. The NFADs used in this report have a (VBR)
temperature coefficient such that below 200 K the DCR
3FIG. 1. Experimental setup of the COW QKD system. Alice’s part (left) consists of a continuous wave DFB laser at 1550 nm
which is modulated using an electro-optic intensity modulator, before passing through a set of attenuators to regulate the photon
number per pulse. The state preparation frequency is set to 625 MHz. Bob’s system consists of an asymmetric beam splitter
which provides a passive choice of measurement basis, following which the photons either travel directly to the SPDD (Data
detector) or pass through an imbalanced interferometer. The phase of the interferometer is maintained such that SPDM is on
the destructive port, and the visibility can be calculated by registering the detections due to the interfering (two neighbouring
pulses) and non-interfering events (single pulse). The two InGaAs/InP NFAD SPDs are both cooled by a single stirling cooler.
The quantum channel consists of ULL fibre whilst a clock signal is distributed from Alice to Bob via the synchronisation channel,
both of which are equal in length. All of the processes from the state preparation through to the sifting are carried with the
use of a field-programable gate array (FPGA) on each side, whilst the subsequent CPP (error correction, etc) is completed in
on-board software. An ethernet link is used as the service channel and all of the passed messages are authenticated.
drops by approximately a factor of two with every 10 K.
We have observed this trend down to temperatures of less
than 150 K, where a DCR of a few counts per second can
be achieved at detection efficiencies of more than 20%,
which is comparable to many SNSPDs6.
In practice it is not always beneficial to operate the de-
tector at the lowest temperature since, for a given dead-
time, the after-pulse probability increases exponentially
with reducing temperatures29. This is not a problem be-
cause as the channel length is increased (i.e., increasing
channel loss), the detection rates drop exponentially, al-
lowing a longer dead-time to be applied without effecting
the detection rates. Therefore, for each distance there ex-
ists an optimum detector temperature, which should be
set such that the DCR is close to being the dominant
source of the QBER.
The QKD system was tested over fibre lengths of 100-
307 km and the operating temperature was varied be-
tween 223-153 K, whilst the dead time was varied be-
tween 8-115 µs (see SI for details of the experimental set-
tings). The SKRs achieved at each distance are shown in
figure 2b and the corresponding error rates are plotted in
figure 2c. Theoretical curves are plotted for the minimum
and maximum detector temperatures to demonstrate the
adaptability of the system at different distances. A SKR
of 12.7 kbps was generated at 104 km, while at 307 km
the SKR was 3.18 bps. Since the DCR increases faster
with temperature above 200 K29, it was not feasible to
increase the temperature to more than 223 K, where a
minimum achievable dead time was around 8µs. For
this reason, the NFAD SPDs are optimal for distances
>100 km. For shorter distances, it is better to use rapid
gating detectors operating as high as room temperature,
which do not require dead time30. At the longest dis-
tance, the visibility dropped to 97.0% (from >98%) due
to the increased difficulty of its stabilisation (see Meth-
ods), due to the large integration times required. We
adapted the ncpp for each fibre length to maintain rea-
sonable collection times (see SI for details) and could use
ncpp = 6.6 × 105 even at the longest distance. Figure 3
shows the system performance over a continuous period
of 70 hours at a distance of 200 km, showing that stable
operation could be maintained, with automatic tracking
of the temporal alignment and the visibility. The average
QBER and visibility were 1.55% and 97.7% respectively
whilst the SKR was around 900 bps.
4a
b
c
FIG. 2. (a) Numerical optimisation of the SKRs versus dis-
tance for different CPP block sizes ncpp = 10
s with s =
4, 5, 6, 7 (left to right). The results are calculated using the old
bound23 (dashed blue lines) and the bound presented in this
work (solid red lines). The asymptotic limit is represented by
the black dash-dot line. Experimental parameters used for the
calculation were taken as for the 307 km experimental mea-
surement and the visibility was set to 98.0%. (b) Experimen-
tal final secret key rate versus distance. Theoretical plots for
different temperature limits are plotted, which show the ad-
vantage of increasing the temperature at shorter fibre lengths,
which reduces the detector saturation. (c) QBER (black tri-
angles) and visibility (blue squares) measured for each fibre
length.
III. CONCLUSION
To summarise, we have demonstrated a robust and au-
tonomous QKD system, based on practical and compact
InGaAs SPDs, which achieves secure key distribution
over 307 km. Moreover, we have sharpened the finite-key
security analysis, which improves the performance of
the QKD protocol when using small CPP block sizes.
This has enabled us to provide a quantifiable security
parameter for the complete protocol (qkd = 4 × 10−9),
which has not been possible before for QKD systems
operating over 150 km. This work demonstrates that
practical, robust and autonomous QKD is feasible
over very long distances even with standard telecom
components in a rack mounted architecture.
a
b
FIG. 3. QKD system stability over 64 hours with 200 km of
fibre showing (a) the SKR and (b) the corresponding QBER
and visibility as a function of time. The detector temperature
was set to 183 K. one of the advantages of the COW protocol
is that the bit string is encoded in the time basis and the
phase basis is only used for the monitoring of the channel dis-
turbance. Hence, even if the visibility is low, the errors in the
raw bit string are not necessarily affected, meaning only the
eavesdroppers mutual information is altered but not the mIR
in Eq. 1. This is contrary to the DPS protocol22, where the
bit string is encoded in the phase, such that both of the terms
would be affected. As seen in (a), the QBER fluctuations are
significantly smaller than those of the visibility, highlighting
the importance of this.
IV. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Experimental details The secret key post-processing
flow is illustrated in figure 1. The information reconcilia-
tion (IR) is carried out using the CASCADE algorithm31,
which was chosen over an LDPC solution23 due to its
increased efficiency of processing small blocks and the
fact that high throughput was not required. The IR
processing block size was typically 2-3 orders of mag-
nitude smaller than ncpp, meaning that a frequent mea-
sure of the QBER could be obtained, which is useful for
active stabilisations of parameters such as the intensity
modulator bias voltage. Once the error corrected string
reaches the size of the CPP block, error verification is
carried out, followed by computation of equation (1) to
set the compression ratio of the subsequent privacy am-
plification (PA) step. We operate in a trusted detector
scenario, meaning that the dark count contribution to
Vˆ and Qˆ in equation (1) are subtracted. To facilitate
this, only the detector DCR has to be determined accu-
rately, however, it is straightforward to characterise, even
at random times. The security level in this work was cho-
sen such that β = 10−9, whilst the failure probabilities
5of the error verification and service channel authentica-
tion were ∼ 10−11 and ∼ 10−15. This gives us an upper
bound on the total security parameter for our system of
qkd = 4× 10−9, for all fibre lengths tested in this work.
To achieve long term operational stability, the fibre
length mismatch between the synchronisation and quan-
tum channels is tracked by oversampling the input detec-
tor signal at 2.5 GHz and using the subsequent statistics
to shift the detection window even before significant er-
rors are induced. The visibility specifically, was stabilised
by adjusting the wavelength of the DFB laser through the
adjustment of the drive current.
The SPD temperatures were achieved using a stirling
cycle cooler, which are significantly more efficient than
electrical Peltier coolers and are capable of achieving sig-
nificantly lower temperatures. Such cooling technology
will enable the complete QKD system to be integrated
into telecom standard rack mountable package.
Sketch of security analysis. Here, we briefly sketch
the proof for the bound on the secret key length, i.e.,
equation (1), and the complete security analysis is de-
ferred to the SI. The technical part of our security anal-
ysis lies in finding a bound on the smooth min-entropy
of X given E, i.e., Hmin(X|E), where  is the smooth-
ing parameter, X is the random variable describing the
raw key and E represents the overall knowledge of the
adversary. To arrive at equation (1), we first use the
quantum leftover hash lemma25, which says that the ex-
tractable secret key length ` is approximately equal to
the Hmin(X|E).
Second, by using certain chain rules for smooth en-
tropies and assuming collective attacks, we are able to
put a lower bound on the smooth min-entropy of X given
E in terms of the von Neumann entropy of X given E.
This essentially allows us to use the main results from
Branciard et al27., where they found a lower bound on
the von Neumann entropy of X given E for the COW
protocol in terms of the expected bit error rate and vis-
ibility. In order to account for finite-size correction of
the visibility statistics, we derive a tight tail inequality
that allows us to relate the expected visibility Vkey to the
observed Vobs. More specifically, let λ = 1/2 − Vobs/2,
then the deviation term in Eq. (2) (for simplicity we let
t(ncpp, nvis, λ, ) = t) is given as
t =
√
8(ncpp + nvis)λ(1− λ)
nvisncpp
log
√
ncpp + nvisC√
2pincppnvisλ(1− λ)
,
(3)
where
C = e
(
1
8(ncpp+nvis)
+ 112nvis
− 112nvisλ+1−
1
12nvis(1−λ)+1
)
. (4)
In other words, Vkey ≥ Vobs − t =: Vˆ is true except with
probability . Using this tail inequality together with the
above arguments, we thus arrive at an upper bound for `
which is essentially dependent on the security parameter
qkd, observed statistics, the CPP block size ncpp and the
random sample size nvis.
Ultra-low-loss fibre. Beyond improving the per-
formance of the QKD system, significant gains can be
achieved by reducing the loss of the quantum channel.
Due to this, developments in optical fibre technology hold
at important role for QKD performance. The ultra-low-
loss fibres based on silica were achieved by taking careful
considerations to the doping levels and the manufactur-
ing process (refer to SI for full discussion). The fibers
used in the current work have an average attenuation
of 0.160 dB/km without splices and connectors. It is ex-
pected that it could be possible to create fibers with an
attenuation of less than 0.1 dB/km in the future32, which
would mean that the distance of QKD could increase to
over 500 km.
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I. EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS
In the table below, we list out the key experimental (optimised) parameters for each distance.
TABLE I. Overview of experimental parameters at different distances.
Quantum channel Detectors Distillation Performance
Length Attn T DCRdat τdat DCRmon τmon µ ncpp tcpp fec fsec Vobs Qtot rsec
(km) (dB) (K) (cps) (µs) (cps) (µs) (s) (bps)
104 16.9 223 548 8.6 384 33.9 0.06 1.97 · 107 536.8 1.217 0.347 0.983 0.024 1.27 · 104
153 25.7 203 117 25.4 86.54 76.0 0.09 1.97 · 107 1450 1.272 0.310 0.981 0.015 5.20 · 103
203 34.1 183 16.2 42.3 14.4 88.9 0.10 1.05 · 107 3108 1.271 0.301 0.982 0.015 1.02 · 103
256 42.6 163 3.26 84.5 2.80 105.8 0.09 1.3 · 106 8586 1.228 0.230 0.984 0.020 78.0
307 51.9 153 1.33 114 0.87 114 0.07 6.6 · 105 17245 1.287 0.084 0.970 0.035 3.18
II. DETAILS OF SECURITY ANALYSIS
Here, we provide details of the security analysis mentioned in the methods section. First, we
introduce the security criteria which we are using. Second, we describe the security model, i.e, the
assumptions used in the security analysis, and the class of attacks which we are considering. Finally,
we derive a bound on the extractable secret key length in terms of the experimental statistics.
A. Security Criteria and Universal Composable Security
A QKD protocol either aborts or outputs a secret key pair S and Sˆ for Alice and Bob, re-
spectively. Here, we assume that the secret key pair S and Sˆ have the same length `. That
is, the secret key space (given that the protocol does not abort) is the set of all binary strings
of length `. In the event that the protocol aborts, it outputs S = Sˆ =⊥. Ideally, we like the
QKD protocol to meet two criteria, namely the correctness criterion and secrecy criterion. The
correctness criterion is satisfied if the secret keys are identical, i.e., S = Sˆ. To state the secrecy
criterion, we first need to have a description of the correlation between the secret key and Eve.
In particular, let system E be the information that Eve gathers during the execution of the QKD
protocol, then the correlation between Alice and Eve can be described by a classical-quantum state
ρSE =
∑
s PS(s)|s〉〈s| ⊗ σE|S=s, where {σE|S=s} is the set of conditional quantum states held by
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2Eve. The secrecy criterion is satisfied if the classical-quantum state ρSE = US ⊗ ρE , where US is
the uniform mixture of all possible secret key values.
In reality, however, perfect correctness and secrecy cannot be achieved. To allow for some
errors, we consider the following correctness criterion and secrecy criterion. Particularly, we say
that the protocol is εcor-correct if the pair of output secret keys are identical with probability at
least 1−εcor, and the protocol is εsec-secret if it outputs a secret key S with ‖ρSE−US⊗ρE‖1 ≤ 2∆
and (1−pabort)∆ ≤ εsec, where pabort is the probability that the protocol aborts. Note that ‖ · ‖1 is
the trace norm. In addition, we say that the protocol is -secure if it is εcor-correct and εsec-secret
with εcor + εsec ≤ .
Importantly, we note that the security definition given above is universal composable [1, 2],
in the sense that secret keys generated by a secure QKD protocol can be safely used in other
composable cryptographic tasks, e.g., the one-time-pad (OTP) encryption scheme. For example,
let KeyGenreal be a QKD protocol that is 1-secure and Encryptreal be an encryption scheme
that is 2-secure (i.e., it is 2-indistinguishable
1 from the ideal encryption scheme Encryptideal),
then universal composability means that the combined crypto-system KeyGenreal ◦ Encryptreal is
(1 + 2)-secure. If Encryptreal is the OTP encryption scheme, then the security of the crypto-
system is 1-secure. This means that the ciphertexts generated by the OTP encryption scheme
are 1-indistinguishable from ciphertexts that would have been generated with a perfectly secret
key. Similarly, if the authentication scheme used in the QKD protocol is auth-indistinguishable
from an ideal authentication scheme, then the QKD protocol is simply auth + 1-secure [3]. This
also explains why the security of QKD can be analysed under the assumption of a perfectly secure
authentication scheme without any loss of generality.
B. Coherent One-Way and Security Model
In the recent decade, it has been pointed out by experimentalist working with coherent state
QKD systems that the phase coherence between adjacent coherent laser pulses may be useful for
detecting photon-number-splitting (PNS) attacks [4]. The first QKD protocol that exploit this
property is the differential-phase-shift (DPS) QKD protocol [5], where the bit values are encoded
into the phase difference between two consecutive coherent laser pulses, and the receiver on Bob’s
side is simply an imbalanced interferometer that measures the interference between two consecutive
laser pulses. Another similar QKD protocol is the coherent one-way (COW) QKD protocol [6],
where instead of encoding the bits into the relative phase of successive coherent laser pulses, the
bits are encoded in time. That is, bit 0 and 1 are sent using |α0〉 := |0〉|α〉 and |α1〉 := |α〉|0〉,
respectively. On Bob’s side, he simply recovers the bit value by measuring the arrival time of the
laser pulse, e.g., bit 1 is detected if there is a detection in the later time. To detect attacks on |α0〉
and |α1〉, Alice randomly sends an additional test state, |αt〉 := |α〉|α〉, to check for phase coherence
between any two successive laser pulses. Therefore, phase coherence can be checked in any of these
sequences, |α0〉|α1〉, |α0〉|αt〉, |αt〉|α1〉, |αt〉, |αt〉|αt〉, by using an imbalanced interferometer with a
pulse delay on Bob’s side
The security of COW protocol has been extensively studied under several attack scenarios [6–9],
however, a general security analysis still somewhat remains elusive; note that Ref. [8] gave the most
general security analysis to date. This impasse is mainly due to the difficulty in interpreting the
phase coherence measurement as a measurement on individual states. Nevertheless, by making
reasonable assumptions about Eve’s attack strategies, it is possible to derive non-trivial security
1 More precisely, we consider a hypothetical game in which an abstract device called the distinguisher has to guess
correctly the identity of the protocol (i.e., whether it is the real protocol P or the ideal protocol P∗) when given
access to the inputs/outputs of the protocol. We say P and P∗ are -indistinguishable if, for any distinguisher, the
probability of guessing correctly is at most 1/2 + /2.
3bounds for the COW protocol. For instance, if Eve is restricted to collective attacks (i.e., Eve
interacts identically and independent with each individual state) and that she either forwards an
empty state or a single photon to Bob, upper bounds on the asymptotic secret key rate can be
derived [7]. In particular, we refer to Ref. [7]’s collective attack model:
|√µ〉|0〉 → |00〉|vµ0〉E +
√
(1−Q)µt|10〉|p10µ0〉E +
√
Qµt|01〉|p01µ0〉E
|0〉|√µ〉 → |00〉|v0µ〉E +
√
(1−Q)µt|01〉|p010µ〉E +
√
Qµt|10〉|p100µ〉E
|√µ〉|√µ〉 → |00〉|vµµ〉E +
√
(1−Q)µt(|01〉|p01µµ〉E + |10〉|p10µµ〉E), (1)
where |vjk〉 ∀ j, k ∈ {0, µ} are the states Eve adds to the vacuum component of each individual
two-mode coherent state, and |p10jk〉 and |p01jk〉 ∀ j, k ∈ {0, µ} are the states Eve adds to the single-
photon component of each individual two-mode coherent state. This attack model is, in fact,
based on the observation that all practical intensity modulators have finite extinction ratio. That
is, instead of producing perfectly modulated intensities µ and 0, practical intensity modulators
produce (1−Q)µ and Qµ. Therefore, we expect Q fraction of the detected events to be erroneous.
Finally, we remark that the assumption of collective attacks is not overly optimistic, since it has
been shown in Ref. [8] that Eve gains only very little advantage when the most general attack is
considered.
C. Bounds on extractable secret key length
To start with, let us introduce a fundamental result in quantum cryptography, in particular, the
Quantum Leftover Hash Lemma (QLHL) [1, Corollary 5.6.1], which plays a central role in privacy
amplification. The QLHL says that a ∆-secret key of length ` can be extracted from X (recall that
X is the bit string used for key distillation) if
∆ = 2+
1
2
√
2`−Hmin(X|E+), (2)
where Hmin(X|E+) is smooth min-entropy of X given E+, which quantifies the amount of uncer-
tainty inX when given access to quantum side information E+. Here, the quantum side information
E+ is the overall information Eve gathers up to the error verification step. The goal here is to
show that the proposed secret key length (i.e., Eq. (1) in main text)
` ≤ max
β∈(0,εqkd/4]
⌊
ncpp
[
1− Qˆ− (1− Qˆ)h
(
1 + ξ(µ, Vˆ
2
)]
− 7
√
ncpp log2
1
β
−mIR − log2
2
4εcorβ2
⌋
,
(3)
implies a ∆ ≤ εqkd secret key. This is equivalent to showing that the smooth min-entropy term is
lower bounded by
Hmin(X|E+) ≥ ncpp
[
1− Qˆ− (1− Qˆ)h
(
1
2
+
ξ(µ, Vˆ )
2
)]
−7
√
ncpp log2
1
ε
−mIR− log2
2
εcor
, (4)
where ξ(µ, Vˆ ) is some function to be defined and explained later.
To do that, first, we use a chain rule for smooth min-entropies [1, Theorem 3.2.12] to get
Hmin(X|E+) ≥ Hmin(X|E)−mIR − log2
2
εcor
.
4Roughly speaking, this says that the side information X+ is simply a concatenation of information
X and mIR + log2(2/εcor), where the latter is the number of bits revealed over the public channel
during error correction and error verification. Then, under the assumption that Eve interacts
independently and identically with each individual two-mode coherent state, the smooth min-
entropy of X given E can be lower bounded by using [1, Theorem 3.3.4] and [7, Eqs. (15) and
(B.8)]. In particular, we get
Hmin(X|E) ≥ ncpp
[
1− Qˆ− (1− Qˆ)h
(
1
2
+
ξ(µ, Vˆ )
2
)]
− 7
√
ncpp log2
1

, (5)
where for exp(−µ) > 2(Vˆ (1− Vˆ ))1/2 and Vˆ > 1/2, we have
ξ(µ, Vˆ ) := (2Vˆ − 1) exp(−µ)− 2
√
Vˆ (1− Vˆ )(1− exp(−2µ)).
Recall from the main text that Vˆ is the estimate for the visibility measure, which is defined as
Vˆ := Vobs− t(ncpp, nvis, Vobs, ′) where Vobs is the observed visibility, nvis is the number of bits used
to calculate Vobs and 
′ is the error in the estimation. This estimate lies at the heart of finite-key
security analysis for QKD, where statistics of a small random sample drawn from the measurement
data is used to estimate the statistics of the remaining bit string. In the language of statistical anal-
ysis, this is essentially the same as random sampling without replacement; however, in our case, we
do not have access to the population parameters. For most finite-key security analyses, parameter
estimation is usually achieved by using tail inequalities belonging to a family of Hoeffding-Chernoff
inequalities [10, 11] (see also [12, Theorem 11.2.1]). However, these estimation techniques are often
sub-optimal due to the fact that they use only limited information (i.e., the random sample size
and population size) to construct the confidence interval. By sub-optimal, we mean that the em-
pirical average has a poor convergent rate (towards the asymptotic average) especially when the
sampling size is small. Indeed, put in the context of finite-key security analysis, a small classical
post-processing block size would imply an overly pessimistic estimate of the quantum channel error
rate. As a result, no key extraction is possible if the underlying block size is small; consequently,
this makes QKD very inefficient when the channel loss is high.
To overcome this issue, we consider a direct estimation approach where we exploit the fact
that the error sampling distribution (assuming random sampling without replacement) follows the
hypergeometric distribution. Then, by making use of a sharp inequality for binomial coefficient,
we are able to derive a tight bound on the probability of event Vkey ≤ Vobs − t, where t is some
positive parameter to be determined below.
New tail inequality. Let Z := {z1, z2, z3, · · · , zn+k} be a list of bits, where the number of ones
is unknown. Let Zpe be a random sample (taken without replacement) of size k of Z, and let bkλc
be the number of ones observed, where 0 < λ ≤ 1/2 is the observed error rate. In addition, let the
remaining bits be Zkey = Z \ Zpe with λkey =
∑
zi∈Zkey zi/n. Then, for some positive parameter
′ > 0, we have
Pr
[
λkey ≥ λ+ g(n, k, λ, ′)
]
< ′, (6)
where
g(n, k, λ, ′) :=
√
2(n+ k)λ(1− λ)
kn
log
√
n+ kC(n, k, λ)√
2pinkλ(1− λ)′ , (7)
C(n, k, λ) := exp
(
1
8(n+ k)
+
1
12k
− 1
12kλ+ 1
− 1
12k(1− λ) + 1
)
. (8)
5Proof. Let random variables, Wpe and Wkey, be the number of ones in Zpe and Zkey, respectively.
Then, the number of ones in the list is given by random variable W = Wpe +Wkey. The goal here
is to show that the joint probability of Wkey ≥ (n/k)Wpe + nt and Wpe = bkλc, for some small
t > 0, is extremely unlikely for sufficiently large n+ k. To do that, we first note that
Pr [Wkey/n ≥ λ+ t] = Pr [Wpe = kλ,Wkey ≥ nλ+ nt]
= Pr [Wpe = kλ,W ≥ (n+ k)λ+ nt]
=
∑
w=(n+k)λ+nt
Pr [Wpe = kλ,W = w]
=
∑
w=(n+k)λ+nt
Pr [Wpe = kλ|W = w] Pr[W = w]
=
∑
w=(n+k)λ+nt
(
k
kλ
)(
n
w−kλ
)(
n+k
w
) Pr[W = w],
where the last inequality uses the fact that Pr [Wpe = kλ|W = w] is given by a hypergeometric
distribution: i.e., probability of getting kλ ones in k bits drawn randomly without replacement
from n+ k bits with w ones. Then, by noting that Pr [Wpe = kλ|W = w] is strictly decreasing for
w > (n+ k)λ+ nt, we further get
Pr [Wkey/n ≥ λ+ t] ≤
(
k
kλ
)(
n
nλ+nt
)(
n+k
(n+k)λ+nt
) = ( kkλ)( nnλkey)(
n+k
(n+k)λall
) , (9)
where λkey = λ + t and λall = kλ/(n + k) + nλkey/(n + t). Next, we make use of a sharp double
inequality for binomial coefficient [13]:
e−
1
8nG(α, n) <
(
n
αn
)
< e
(
1
12n
− 1
12nα+1
− 1
12n(1−α)+1
)
G(α, n),
where for α ∈ (0, 1/2] and for n ∈ N+,
G(α, n) :=
α−αn(1− α)−(1−α)n√
2pinα(1− α) .
Applying this inequality to equation (9), we get(
k
kλ
)(
n
nλkey
)(
n+k
(n+k)λall
) < exp (log(2)[kh(λ)− (n+ k)h(λall) + nh(λkey)])C(n, k, λ)√
2pinkλ(1− λ)/(n+ k) , (10)
where
C(n, k, λ) := exp
(
1
8(n+ k)
+
1
12k
− 1
12kλ+ 1
− 1
12k(1− λ) + 1
)
.
Note that we used
√
λall(1− λall) ≤
√
λkey(1− λkey) (recall that by construction, we have λkey ≥
λall), and exp(log(2)h(α)) = (α)
−α(1 − α)−(1−α). Then, by using an inequality for the binary
entropy function, i.e., h(x) ≤ h(x0) + h′(x0)(x− x0) + h′′(x0)(x− x0)2/2 + h′′′(x0)(x− x0)3/6, we
further get
nh(λkey)− (n+ k)h(λall) + (k)h(λ) ≤ h
′′(λall)
2
t2nk
n+ k
= − t
2nk
2 log(2)(n+ k)λall(1− λall) ≤ −
t2nk
2 log(2)(n+ k)λ(1− λ) , (11)
6where the last inequality is obtained by noting that [x(1 − x)]−1 is a decreasing function for
x ∈ (0, 1/2] and that λall ≥ λ. Inserting equation (11) into equation (10) gives(
k
kλ
)(
n
nλkey
)(
n+k
(n+k)λall
) < exp
(
− t2nk2(n+k)λ(1−λ)
)
C (n, k, λ)√
2pinkλ(1− λ)/(n+ k) =: 
′,
The deviation parameter, g, is thus
g(n, k, λ, ) :=
√
2(n+ k)λ(1− λ)
nk
log
√
n+ kC(n, k, λ1)√
2pinkλ(1− λ)′ .
In order to apply the tail inequality to visibility measure, we make use of the relationship V = 1−
2Q. More specifically, after some simple arrangements, we get Pr [Vkey ≤ Vobs − 2g(n, k, λ, ′)] < ′.
Therefore, the deviation term introduced in the main text is simply t(n, k, λ, ′) = 2g(n, k, λ, ′). In
other words, we have Vkey ≥ Vobs − t(ncpp, nvis, Vobs, ′) =: Vˆ with probability at least 1− ′. Note
that ′ can be seen as the significant level associated with standard confidence interval estimation.
The secrecy of our protocol is obtained by inserting equation (4) into equation (2) and using
the proposed secret key length (i.e., equation (3)), which gives ∆ ≤ 2+ β. Finally, by composing
the error probability due to parameter estimation, we thus have a total secrecy of ∆ ≤ 2+ β + ′,
which may be simplified by choosing  = ′ = β = qkd/4; accordingly, we have ∆ ≤ εqkd.
III. ULTRA-LOW-LOSS OPTICAL FIBRE
The total attenuation of an optical fibre is the sum of the intrinsic loss factors such as Rayleigh
scattering αRS, infrared absorption αIR and ultraviolet absorption αUV, as well as the extrinsic loss
factors such as absorption due to transition metals αTM, absorption due OH ions αOH, scattering
due to waveguide imperfections αIM and loss due to fiber bending effects αBL,
α = αRS + αIR + αUV + αTM + αOH + αIM + αBL. (12)
To achieve ultra-low attenuation, it is necessary to minimise the contributions from both extrinsic
and intrinsic loss factors. The contaminants due to transition metals can be eliminated practically
in the fibre preform manufacturing processes by using chemical vapour deposition techniques with
high pure chemical row materials. The OH concentration can be reduced to the minimum level
through chlorine drying. Waveguide imperfection loss is caused by the geometry fluctuation at the
core and cladding boundary. The boundary fluctuation is mainly due to the residual stress which
is induced during the manufacturing process. The residual stress depends on the magnitude of the
viscosity difference between the core and cladding and the fibre drawing tension. The stress can
be reduced by matching the viscosity of the core and cladding [14]. For the intrinsic factors, the
most important one is the Rayleigh scattering loss. The Rayleigh scattering loss can be expressed
by the sum of two contributions from density and concentration fluctuations [15],
αRS = αρ + αC . (13)
The density fluctuation contribution to the scattering coefficient depends on the fictive temperature,
Tf, which is determined as the temperature where the glass structure is the same as that of the
supercooled liquid,
αρ =
8pi3
3λ4
n8p2βTkBTf. (14)
7where λ is the wavelength of incident light, n the refractive index, p the photo-elastic coefficient,
kB the Boltzmann constant, and βT the isothermal compressibility. The concentration fluctuation
contribution is proportional to,
αC ∼ ∂n
∂C
〈
∆C2
〉
Tf. (15)
Because the Rayleigh scattering is mainly caused by frozen-in density fluctuation, to suppress it
as much a possible it is necessary to reduce Tf to increase structural relaxation. To minimise the
concentration fluctuation, it is advantageous to reduce the GeO2 dopant level in the core because
the Rayleigh scattering loss is proportional the GeO2 concentration. For this reason, it is better to
use pure silica material in the core. However, the pure silica material has a high fictive temperature,
which increases the density fluctuation contribution. To reduce the density fluctuation, the core
composition needs to be carefully engineered with a small amount of dopant to reduce the fictive
temperature while keeping the concentration fluctuation negligible [16, 17]. The fictive temperature
is also affected by the cooling rate during the fibre draw. It is advantageous to use a slow cooling
rate to promote the structural relaxation. With these considerations, it has been predicted that
the intrinsic loss of silica based optical fibers could be below 0.1 dB/km [18].
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